In this article I to switch the ontological categories for thinking art away from a certain representational register. 1 In particular, I want to explore other ways of thinking the ethical and political effectivity of art, and specifically its 'other worldliness' (its resistance to the present milieu) away from a horizon of transcendence and a logic of the possible. I propose to do this by adopting a double pronged and somewhat experimental approach. The article then involves two philosophical discussions -or two philosophical encounters -with Deleuze and at the same time a kind of non-philosophical encounter with an art practice which mirrors the philosophy (and in some senses 'grounds' it). To a certain extent I might be accused of deliberately misreading
The late 1960s were of course also a time of wider political unrest and ethical experimentation.
Indeed, for Hardt and Negri, the plane of immanence, understood by them in a geopolitical sense, was itself being activated once more in a new revolutionary energy: new non-traditional modes of being, and new non-formalised practices of life and art, were both being experimented with. 5 It is the same moment that Deleuze's philosophy comes into its own, the publication of Difference and Repetition announcing a project of thinking differently and of constructing an image of thought beyond representation. This article then marks a moment, the moment, in which a philosophy of difference and an art practice of immanence are both being constructed (what we might call in each case a move towards abstraction). Of course, this is not the first time that such a philosophy is produced (one need only think of Spinoza), but it might be argued that at this moment philosophy and art so closely follow one another that they become two forks of the same serpent's tongue.
The Virtual (or Deleuze's Bergsonism)
In a difficult passage from Bergsonism Deleuze outlines what for him, as for Bergson before him, is the important, in fact crucial, difference between the ontological couplings of the actual and the virtual, as opposed to those of the real and the possible. This difference, as Deleuze remarks elsewhere, is not simply a question of terminology, but rather 'of existence itself.' 6 Here is the passage in full:
The possible has no reality (although it may have an actuality); conversely, the virtual is not actual, but as such possesses a reality … On the other hand, or from another point of view, the possible is that which is 'realised' (or is not realised). Now the process of realisation is subject to two essential rules, one of resemblance and another of limitation. For the real is supposed to be in the image of the possible that it realises. (It simply has existence or reality added to it, which is translated by saying that, from the point of view of the concept there is no difference between the possible and the real.) And, every possible is not realised, realisation involves a limitation by which some possibles are supposed to be repulsed or thwarted, while others 'pass' into the real.
The virtual on the other hand, does not have to be realised, but rather actualised; and the rules of actualisation are not those of resemblance and limitation, but those of difference or divergence and of creation.
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The possible then is realised through resemblance and limitation, whereas the virtual is actualised through difference and creation. Indeed, the key issue with the possible, which is implied above and pursued by Deleuze in Difference and Repetition, is that it is 'retroactively fabricated in the image of what resembles it.' 8 Put simply, the possible is always already a kind of representation of the real that appears to pre-exist it. We might say then that the possible becomes as such by a kind of sleight of hand. It is in fact merely an isotope of the real inasmuch as it only lacks reality (it merely 'doubles like with like'). 9 The possible then operates as a kind of mirror image of the real, but one which sets itself up as if it offered a 'real' alternative. This is the illusionistic moment, the camera obscura of the possible which appears to offer something 'new' but in fact only offers more of the same. Indeed we might rename this logic of the possible a logic of utopia, inasmuch as utopian thinking (and this includes representations of utopia) is often locked into this double movement. Utopia, we might say, can be nothing more than a mirror reflection (however distorted) of the real.
As a contrast to Deleuze we might look at how Adorno deploys a notion of utopian thought, specifically in relation to art. Here he is from Aesthetic Theory:
Art's utopia, the counter-factual yet-to-come is draped in Black, it goes on being a recollection of the possible with a critical edge against the real ... It is the possible, as promised by its impossibility. Art is the promise of happiness, a promise that is constantly being broken.
can be reasonably practised in the face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of redemption. 11 In a sense then Adorno has abandoned the existent. Indeed, this is what gives his work its particular tenor.
On one level this is certainly different to Deleuze's position inasmuch as the possible, for both writers, appears to be a form of transcendent criticism (that is to say, criticism made from the standpoint of redemption). If, however, we were to position Adorno's broken promise as a form of immanent criticism, that which seeks to grasp the contradictions inherent in the existent by presenting, via art, something 'different', then we might be able to stake out some common territory between Adorno and Deleuze. 12 In fact there seem to be many points of connection 12 This is to simplify somewhat Adorno's notion of criticism and his own use of the categories transcendent and immanent. In fact for Adorno both of these forms of criticism have advantages -but also drawbacks: transcendent criticism allows a vantage point 'outside' of ideology and thus the possibility of a critique of the whole but in so doing it locates itself at a kind of fictitious (and utopian) Archimedean Point.
It also tends towards a kind of escapism, and to sweeping (barbaric) generalisations. Immanent criticism, on the other hand, seeks to grasp the contradictions within concrete phenomena (i.e. culture). It seeks to reveal the contradictions between the objective idea and its pretension but as such it can overlook the general ideological character of society (it neglects to link the object back to the life processes that produced it). Ultimately, of course, it is a form of dialectical criticism, moving between the two 'perspectives', which Adorno advocates (See T. Adorno, 'Cultural Criticism and Society,' Prisms, trans. S. and S. Weber (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1981), esp. pp. 23-33) . It is worth pointing out here that the notion of criticism, as Adorno deploys it, is of a fundamentally different nature to the notion of philosophy, as Deleuze and Guattari understand it. The first is negative almost by definition, the second, again by definition, is creative and affirmative. This is not to say that one must be oblivious to the history, the 'life processes', that produce Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy, but it is to say that Adorno's critical operation presumes the always already ideological character of philosophy and thus can operate as a kind of trap for thought. 13 In a tantalising footnote Ernst Bloch is given as an example of a thinker of immanent utopias (WP, p.
224, f. 12).
conjunction of philosophy, or of the concept, with the present milieu. 14 For Deleuze and Guattari this utopian impulse in philosophy (which is philosophy) involves a resistance to the present.
'The creation of concepts [which] in itself calls for a future form, for a new earth and people that
do not yet exist.' 15 That is, precisely, revolution, understood as the affirmation of a 'people-yetto-come.'
Can Adorno be brought into this fundamentally affirmative and creative project? To a certain extent (after all both Adorno and Deleuze articulate a resistance to the present, and in so doing make a call to the future), however it is really Adorno's attitude, his philosophical attitude, which is the stumbling block (his particular style of thought as perhaps Deleuze would say). Adorno, as a thinker, is trapped in a form of negativity (as are all proponents of negative critique). 16 For
Adorno then, art, that very autonomous of objects, operates in/as a negative dialectic (it is the 'impossible possible'). We can return to Deleuze here and remind ourselves that Deleuze's issue with the possible is that it is never a genuinely creative category (even if it may seem so) but is in fact always already limited by the real that it resembles and cannot help but resemble. This is the case even, and perhaps especially, when it seeks to negate this real. This is not to disavow the criticality of art works but it is to say that this criticality must be accompanied by creativity (and in fact we might say that the former, when it really is criticism, is only ever really produced by the latter).
Back to Deleuze then, who in his discussion of the possible is keen to demarcate a notion of difference that does not imply a negativity and indeed that escapes 'identity thinking' altogether.
He will do this not through recourse to a negative dialectic but through recourse to a notion of the virtual. First though, back to the possible once more who's characteristic, for Deleuze, is that it 'refers to the form of identity in the concept'. Another way of thinking this process of actualisation is as problem solving. To quote Deleuze:
'the virtual possesses the reality of a task to be performed or a problem to be solved: it is the problem which orientates, conditions and engenders solutions, but these do not resemble the conditions of the problem.' 23 It is in this sense, thinking biologically, that the organism is the solution to a problem: the eye as a solution to the specific 'problem' of light; the claw as a solution to the need for food, and so on. Art can also be seen as a 'solution' in this sense, as part of a general, creative evolution. The forms of art precisely providing 'solutions' to 'problems' of space, time -perception and memory (that is, specifically human problems).
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One way to think this virtual multiplicity is as the 'pure' memory of Bergson's thesis. As such the virtual can be understood as a temporal dimension of the object. The virtual is 'a part of the real object -as though the object had one part of itself in the virtual into which it plunged as though into an objective dimension.' 25 We might say then that the virtual is a kind of fractal realm. The virtual would always be 'contained' within the actual as it were, though in an ever more condensed state as it approaches the present. In fact the same might be said of perception: the closer one is the more apparently simple forms become complex, which is to say the realms of space and time are both fractal in character.
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It is here that the differences between Deleuze's notion of the virtual and its more common usage within AI and VR parlance become clear. In these latter places and spaces the virtual is understood as a kind of property of matter, albeit matter interpenetrated by information. With
Deleuze however the virtual differs in kind from the actual. It is not 'of' matter but 'of' spirit as 23 DR, p. 212. 24 This is precisely the argument set out in Henri Focillon's The Life Forms of Art, trans. C. Beecher
Hogan and G. Kubler (New York: Zone Books, 1992) . Here the work of art is 'an attempt to express something that is unique, it is an affirmation of something that is whole, complete, absolute. But it is likewise an integral part of a system of highly complex relationships' (ibid., p. 31). Art emerges from this complexity but does not necessarily resemble these conditions. Furthermore art works back on these conditions, for example, in relation to space, Focillon points out: 'A work of art is situated in space. But it will not do to say it simply exists in space: a work of art treats space according to its own needs, defines space and even creates such space as may be necessary to it' (ibid., p. 65).
Bergson might say (as Deleuze remarks, Bergson reserves the use of the possible only in relation to matter -that is to a closed system). 27 In a sense the realm of pure perception ('before' any selection on the basis of needs and interests has been made) is a virtual realm but this 'pure perception' is not the same kind of virtuality as that of pure memory (it exists, as Bergson demonstrates on a different axis: it is spatial rather than temporal). 28 In fact both pure perception (matter -or, in Deleuze's terms the 'movement-image') and pure memory (time -or, in Deleuze's terms again, the 'movement-image') are intuitive abstractions from what, in experience, is a mixed state of affairs (our habits of representation and of representational thought). Pure memory ('identical to the totality of the past') is then like pure perception ('identical to the whole of matter'), an inhuman, super objective state which can only be accessed intuitively. Put bluntly, it is difficult given the present human configuration to access this pure perception and pure memory which is nevertheless a kind of 'background' to our experience. We live in a state in which differences in kind (between matter and memory) are mixed. We are 'badly analysed composites'
'that arbitrarily group things that differ in kind.' 29 Deleuze's transcendental empiricism is then as such because it involves intuitively going beyond experience towards the conditions of experience (and not the conditions of possible experience (Kant) -but the conditions of real experience). 30 This implies an ethical imperative, the latter understood as a pragmatic enquiry into our particular space-time coordinates (or simply our consciousness). We must divide these mixed composites along lines that differ in kind, and then follow these lines to their pure states, before returning back, armed with a kind of Spinozist 'knowledge', to the mixtures.
When it comes to actually actualising different spatialities and temporalities then technology has a crucial role to play. For Deleuze this is paradigmatically the case with the movie camera. In say then that the camera, and in fact all 'visualising' technologies, continue Bergson's intuitive method 'outside' of philosophy. We might also say that the actualisations these technologies perform and produce are specifically non-human, or machinic modes of consciousness.
Equally important is that we look to the field of that which has already been actualised. Again, we must ask the fundamentally ethical questions of how and why such and such becomes actual (how and why are we the mixtures that we are, perceiving the mixtures that we do?) Indeed, following
Brian Massumi, it might be argued that it is not the actual that should hold our attention, nor in fact the virtual, but rather the processes of actualisation (the processes of selection if you like).
We need to attend to that border, or 'seeping edge' as Massumi calls it, between the actual and the virtual. For Massumi it is precisely in this place that potential is found, the potential for transformation.
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We might say then, again following Massumi, that the world of things (the object world) is but that which has been extracted or has emerged from the realm of relations, or conditions. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996) , is that it is the realm of affect. The 'seeping edge' then is the point at which that which is immanent to experience (affect) becomes conceptualised within experience (specifically with language) (pp. 217-239). This is not however to contradict a more Bergsonian notion of the virtual as the relation between affect and its articulation is specifically a temporal one. 33 Antonio Negri also attends to this 'edge' -which he names 'Kairos' -where invention and innovation take place:
ontological coordinates of the actual and the virtual operate 'within' immanence (within this world). The virtual does not lack a reality, but is merely that which has yet to be actualised.
Excursus 1: Mirror Travel
In the essay 'Entropy and the New Monuments' Robert Smithson writes about those artists who are his contemporaries (and as such he is also writing about himself) precisely in terms of pure matter and pure memory. The new monuments, the emerging minimalist objects and expanded practices of the late 1960s, are here described as crystal objects with a face turned to the actual, and a face plunging deep into the virtual. Indeed, for Smithson, this is what characterises the new monuments: they present a different view of matter and a different conception of time:
Instead of causing us to remember the past like the old monuments, the new monuments seem to cause us to forget the future. Instead of being made of natural materials, such as marble, granite, or other kinds of rock, the new monuments are made of artificial materials, plastic, chrome and electric light. They are not built for the ages but against the ages. They are involved in a systematic reduction of time down to fractions of seconds, rather than in representing the long spaces of centuries. Both past and future are placed into an objective present. This kind of time has little or no space in it; it is stationary and without movement, it is going nowhere, it is antiNewtonian, as well as being instant, and it is against the wheels of the time-clock ...
[The] destruction of classical time and space is based on an entirely new notion of the structure of matter.
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This 'new' image of time is then one in which the past is coextensive with the present, which itself is coextensive with the future. This is an image of time in which the latter is no longer When a thing is seen through the consciousness of temporality, it is changed into something that is nothing. This all-engulfing sense provides the mental ground for the object, so that it ceases being a mere object and becomes art. The object gets to be less and less but exists as something clearer. Athlone, 1995) for a discussion of this revolution in time (and encapsulated by Hamlet's phrase 'The time is out of joint'):
As long as time remained on its hinges, it is subordinate to movement: it is the measure of movement, interval or number. This was the view of ancient philosophy. But time out of joint signifies the reversal of the movement-time relationship. It is now movement that is subordinate to time. Everything changes, including movement … this is the first great Kantian reversal' (ibid., p. vii).
this depends on the viewer. Not everyone sees the art in the same way, only an artist viewing art knows the ecstasy or dread, and this viewing takes place in time.
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It is then as much the viewer (a specific kind of viewer) as the object that produces art in this sense (we might say that actualises the virtualities of the 'object'). For Smithson art is the name for this encounter in which an object rejoins the flow of time it was always already a part of (but had been extracted from). Indeed all these objects and practices, these new monuments, might be located on that 'seeping edge' between the actual and the virtual, which we might rephrase here as the coexistence of the pure past (and future) with the present, or simply a seeing of the object as object, and a seeing of the object in process, as duration.
In In the side of a heap of crushed limestone the twelve mirrors were cantilevered in the midst of large clusters of butterflies that had landed on the limestone. For brief moments flying butterflies were reflected; they seemed to fly through a sky of gravel. Shadows cast by the mirrors contrasted with those seconds of colour. A scale in terms of 'time' rather than 'space' took place. The mirror itself is not subject to duration, because it is an ongoing abstraction that is always available and timeless. The reflections on the other hand, are fleeting instances that evade measure. This 'switching' of registers via the mirror displacements (for Deleuze it would be the crystal) occurs in 'space' as well as time. 42 The mirror displacement journey involves the actualisation of Time has to split at the same time as it sets itself out or unrolls itself: it splits in two dissymmetrical jets, one of which makes all the present pass on, while the other preserves all the past. Time consists of this split, and it is this, it is time, that we see in the crystal. The crystal-image was not time, but we see time in the crystal. We see in the crystal the perpetual foundation of time, non-chronological time, Cronos and not
Chronos. This is the powerful, non-organic Life which grips the world. The visionary, the seer, is the one who sees in the crystal, and what he sees is the gushing of time as dividing in two, as splitting' (C2, p. 81).
those micro-universes usually imperceptible. Here for example is Smithson again, this time from 'The Fifth Mirror Displacement' (Fig. 2) :
On the outskirts of the ruins of Palenque or in the skirts of Coatlicue, rocks were overturned; first the rock was photographed, then the pit that remained. 'Under each rock is an orgy of scale,' said Coatlicue ... Each pit contained miniature earthworks -tracks and traces of insects and other sundry small creatures. In some beetle dung, cobwebs, and nameless slime. In others cocoons, tiny ant nests and raw roots. If an artist could see the world through the eyes of a caterpillar he might be able to make some fascinating art. Each of these secret dens was also the entrance to the abyss. Smithson's essay is then a work of imagination, a kind of creative fabulation, a story that mythifies reality. 45 And yet the essay also works as a manual. It gives instruction on 'mirror travel', an undertaking we might recast in Deleuzian terms as 'travel' 'into' the virtual.
Importantly this mirror travel must be performed: the instructions must be followed. Smithson
gives us an account of his own journey, and in doing so informs us how we might repeat the experiment. What we have here then is an example of a pragmatic and practical philosophy (philosophy as a way of life as it were). After all you can read, and understand the concepts of the actual and the virtual but in order to actualise the virtual then these 'concepts' need to be incarnated in other materials and via other practices. We might say that this is the ritualistic function of art such as Smithson's which endeavours to take us out of our usual space/time coordinates, precisely to produce a reconfiguration of our habitual mode of being. This is not to give the film an overly narrative/linear reading for in fact Barney is attracted to icons such as Serra because they are 'physical states' and not so much 'developed narrative characters' (ibid., p. 59). The connection with Deleuze-Bacon's notion of the figural seems apposite here. There is also the importance of landscape/location in the Cremaster films, as kind of characters in themselves: '...it is important for that landscape to be drawable as a discrete object. That it should be possible to make a sculptural form from the Canadian Rockies or the Utah Salt Flats (ibid., p. 59). As we shall see, Smithson produces just such a sculpture from the Utah landscape. Indeed, Barney's films here mirror Smithson's earthworks: both operate on an epic scale, both are landscape sculptures, and both involve the construction of new myths that invoke a people-yet-to-come.
In short, the first philosophers are those who institute a plane of immanence like a sieve stretched over chaos. In this sense they contrast with sages, who are religious personae, priests, because they conceive of the institution of an always transcendent order imposed from outside . a particular relationship between an external perception as state of a subject and an internal affection as passage from one state to another (exo-and endoreference). We pick out a quality supposedly common to several objects that we perceive, and an affection supposedly common to several subjects who experience it and who, along with us, grasp that quality. Precisely because the plane of immanence is prephilosophical and does not immediately take effect with concepts, it implies a sort of groping experimentation and its layout resorts to measures that are not very respectable, rational or reasonable. These measures belong to the order of dreams, of pathological processes, esoteric experiences, drunkenness, and excess ... To think is always to follow the witch's flight.
which 'seeks to provide chaos with reference points' thus abandoning infinite movement in a general limitation of speed (the slowing down that science, to be as such, must perform). 59 It is also, as we have seen, opposed to religion, which installs a transcendent order from above, by the projection of figures onto the plane of immanence.
This non-philosophical moment of philosophy (that in turn renews philosophy) can only proceed by intuition and by a certain amount of 'losing-one's-self'. Deleuze and Guattari cite the example of Henri Michaux and the notion that one only really thinks by 'becoming something else, something that does not think -an animal, a molecule, a particle -that comes back to thought and revives it.' 60 Deleuze and Guattari are not referring to Michaux's art works here ('usually these measures do not appear in the result, which must be grasped solely in itself and calmly') but rather, it seems to me, are referring to the journeys, the adventures (whether drug influenced or not), which in some senses allow for, and perhaps provoke, such and such a concept, or indeed such and such an art work, to be made. 61 It is at this place that we move away from the three forms of thought to something wilder, something more chaotic. Indeed, later in What is Philosophy? art, science and philosophy are characterised as chaoids, forms of thought which refer back to chaos, and are in fact of chaos (a chaos given consistency). 62 However before this consistency is achieved there is the moment of the encounter with chaos, the confrontation with non-thought. It is in this place, at this moment, that the plane of immanence is instituted, almost as a survival mechanism, but also as that which will allow thought and creativity to unfurl.
It might be useful to turn here from What is Philosophy? to A Thousand Plateaus, the latter being very much a book about the non-philosophical adventures of philosophy. In this earlier, and in many senses wilder, work we have, as might be expected, a series of strategies for 'accessing'
immanence, which is here described in more concrete terms. The plane of immanence in A Thousand Plateaus is a more slippery, we might even say more liquid 'place'. It is Spinoza's God/Nature/substance, but the latter stretched, a place in which:
There are no longer any forms or developments of forms; nor are there subjects or the formation of subjects. There is no structure, any more than there is genesis. There are only relations of 59 WP, p. 42. movement and rest, speed and slowness between unformed elements, or at least between elements that are relatively unformed, molecules and particles of all kinds. There are only haecitties, affects, subjectless individuations that constitute collective enunciations.
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Here the plane of immanence is opposed to the plane of transcendence (also called the plane of organisation and development). It is the realm of the molecular from which molar aggregates such as our subjectivity and identity are formed. 64 It is, if you like, the ground zero of nonorganic life. And it is on, and across, this plane that the 'Body without Organs' (BwO) moves, the latter understood, at this point anyway, as itself a kind of surface upon which the 'I' is a mere striation. As such, the BwO is a mechanism, a procedure, for undoing the strata that binds us:
Let us consider the three great strata concerning us, in other words, the ones that most directly bind us: the organism, signifiance, and subjectification. The surface of the organism, the angle of signifiance and interpretation, and the point of subjectification or subjection. You will be organised, you will be an organism, you will articulate your body -otherwise you're just depraved. You will be signifier and signified, interpreter and interpreted -otherwise you're just a deviant. You will be a subject, nailed down as one, a subject of the enunciation recoiled into a subject of the statement -otherwise you're just a tramp. To the strata as a whole, the BwO opposes disarticulation (or n articulations) as the property of the plane of consistency, experimentation as the operation on that plane (no signifier, never interpret!), and nomadism as the movement (keep moving even in place, never stop moving, motionless voyage, desubjectification).
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The BwO is then, paradoxically, a kind of aesthetic machine but its operating field is immanence rather than transcendence. 73 Hence his preference for material and for forms which arise from the earth itself.
As a case study of this process we might take Smithson's most well known earthwork: The Spiral Jetty (Fig. 3) . Like 'Incidents of Mirror Travel in the Yucatan' it has now disappeared (although it still 'exists' under the waters of the Great Salt Lake in Utah), but like the latter 'The Spiral Jetty'
is also an essay which itself constructs the Spiral Jetty via words. 74 The essay then records and recounts Smithson's selection, construction, and 'activation' of Spiral Jetty. Like 'Incidents' it is also a kind of philosophy, a practical philosophy, in the sense that it draws concepts the ('spiral' or the 'helicopter' for example) across an already constituted plane of immanence, understood here as both Smithson's attitude to the salt lake and the salt lake itself.
The first stage then, as the essay tells us, is the search for the 'site' (we might say the 'throwing down' of the plane, or the construction of the BwO). The search is careful, not just any place will do, but somewhere which 'grabs' Smithson (which 'selects' him as it were). It is in fact the 'site' that will determine the earthwork. Eventually Smithson locates it:
About one mile north of the oil seeps I selected my site. Irregular beds of limestone dip gently eastward, massive deposits of black basalt are broken over the peninsula, giving the region a shattered appearance. It is one of the few places on the lake where the water comes right up to the mainland. Under shallow pinkish water is a network of mud cracks supporting the jig-saw puzzle that composes the salt flats. As I looked at the site, it reverberated out to the horizons only to suggest an immobile cyclone while flickering light make the whole landscape appear to quake. A dormant earthquake spread into the fluttering stillness, into a spinning sensation without movement. This site was a rotary that enclosed itself in an immense roundness. For Smithson then there is not so much a before to the selection, an idea that might be represented in a given site. In fact the site itself functions to suggest the work, and as such might be said to already hold within it a potentiality (precisely the Spiral Jetty) which is then brought out in the resulting construction.
76
The second moment commences with the construction of the jetty itself. The tail and spiral are staked out and then the machines -two dump trucks, a tractor and a front loader -move the earth and fill the jetty in. Smithson's use of machines is important. This is not a return to some kind of primitive pre-modern practice, or rather it is not just this. Indeed Spiral Jetty involves a mobilisation of the technology of modernity but precisely to produce, to actualise, something different (a novel assemblage). The landscape Smithson works on is likewise less a raw 'nature'
than an always already 'contaminated' terrain, a terrain moulded as much by modern man as by elemental forces. Indeed it is particularly these industrial wastelands that attract Smithson, and which provide the ground for his constructions. Again, we might say that these kinds of terrains are already overflowing with potentialities of which the work actualises just a selection. Oxford University Press, 1998). Here he is discussing Spiral Jetty in relation to allegory:
The site-specific work often aspires to a prehistoric monumentality; Stonehenge and the Nazca lines are taken as prototypes. It's 'content' is frequently mythical, as that of the Spiral Jetty, whose form was derived from a local myth of a whirlpool at the bottom of the Great Salt Lake; in this way Smithson exemplifies the tendency to engage in a reading of the site, in terms not only of its topographical specifics but also of its psychological resonances' (ibid., p. 318).
Although agreeing in kind with Owen's notion of allegory in relation to Smithson, one might want to question whether reading is the right term for Smithson's encounter with the site. Indeed, it would seem that Smithson's response and attitude is precisely one of not reading.
On the slopes of Rozel Point I closed my eyes, and the sun burned crimson through the lids. I opened them up and the Great Salt Lake was bleeding scarlet streaks. My sight was saturated by the colour of red algae circulating in the heart of the lake, pumping into ruby currents, no they were veins and arteries sucking up the obscure sediment. My eyes became combustion chambers churning orbs of blood blazing by the light of the sun. All was enveloped in a flaming chromosphere.
78
Finally in the helicopter ride over the jetty the earthwork is further activated. Scale is again introduced (registers are switched). Questions of natural versus artificial become redundant here as Smithson reaches degree 0, THE plane of immanence understood here as precisely a state of non-organic life:
The helicopter manoeuvred the sun's reflections through the Spiral Jetty until it reached the centre. The water functioned as a vast thermal mirror. From that position the flaming reflection suggested the ion source of a cyclotron that extended into a spiral of collapsed matter. All sense of energy accelerated expired into a rippling stillness of reflected heat. A withering light swallowed the rocky particles of the spiral, as the helicopter gained altitude. All existence seemed tentative and stagnant. The sound of the helicopter motor became a primal groan echoing the tenuous aerial views ... I was slipping out of myself again, dissolving into a unicellular beginning, trying to locate the nucleus at the end of the spiral. All that blood stirring makes one aware of protoplasmic solutions, the essential matter between the formed and the unformed, masses of cells consisting largely of water, proteins, lipoids, carbohydrates, and inorganic salts. 79 We might say that the above narrative is merely a fiction, after all Spiral Jetty is at least on one level just earth and rocks deposited in a lake. But Spiral Jetty is also a machine which produces a different experience of the world and thus a different, we might say altered, consciousness. It in this sense that the film of Spiral Jetty is as important as the essay. The film -a kind of geocinema -is a construction just as the essay, and the jetty, themselves are (all involve the manipulation of matter). Through the use of montage, close ups and stills (for example of maps and charts, of the ripples of the lake, of the sunlight), as well as the different 'view points' of the car speeding through the desert towards the lake, the slow motion and low camera angle of the dump trucks constructing the jetty (themselves paralleling the dinosaurs in the Natural History Museum) and the helicopter's birds eye view over the jetty itself, the film actualises the different durations and different scales written about in the essay. The camera then operates here as a machine eye opening us up to other non-human worlds. 80 The soundtrack also works to produce 78 CW, p. 148.
79 CW, p. 149.
80 As Smithson remarks in 'A Cinema Atopia', echoing Deleuze's own thoughts: 'One thing all film has in common is the power to take perception elsewhere ' (CW, p. 138) . In this essay Smithson outlines a kind of different and fractured temporalities, from Smithson's mantra like reading of the directions of the compass to the silences of the National History Museum and the sound of the helicopter blades.
We might say then that the film parallels the work of the essay, which itself parallels the construction of the jetty: each are components of the Spiral Jetty machine whose operative field we might give here a new name: geoaesthetics.
geo-cinema in which 'all films would be brought into equilibrium -a vast mud field of images forever motionless' (CW, p. 142). Smithson also outlines the construction of a literal geo-cinema, made in a cave or cavern, and made out of crude materials. This geo-cinema shows just one film -a record of its own construction.
